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1997 Utah Senate Bill 112, Dramshop Liability Amendments .... 3-4, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: UTAH STATUTES AND COMMON LAW PROVIDE MULTIPLE 
MEANS OF RECOVERY AGAINST PROVIDERS OF ALCOHOL. THE DRAMSHOP ACT 
IS NOT AN EXCLUSIVE REMEDY. 
Counts two and three of Plaintiff's Complaint (R. 6) allege 
causes of action for negligent sale of alcohol to an intoxicated 
or interdicted person by Defendants and willful and wanton 
conduct of Defendants. These two causes of action are based upon 
negligence and willful misconduct in violation of statute. The 
lower Court dismissed those causes of action and ruled that the 
Dramshop Act was Plaintiff's exclusive remedy. 
Plaintiff's position is that the Court erred as a matter of 
law in making that ruling and that in fact, Plaintiff's have a 
common law cause of action and a cause of action for statutory 
violation against the liquor providers. This is the subject of 
Point 3 of Plaintiff's opening brief. 
seeking to justify the ruling of the Court, 
arg y and ask this Court to rule that the Dramshop 
Act other common law and statutory remedies. 
i to it's defense of the Court Order ruling that 
the Dramshop Act pre-emted all other causes of action, Defendants 
purport to provide a history of liability in Utah for furnishing 
alcohol to another. In so doing, the cases of Yost v. State 640 
P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981) and Rees v. Albertson's, Inc. 587 P.2d 130 
(Utah 1978) are cited. 
In Footnote No. 8, Defendants state that neither Rees nor 
Yost are traditional "Dramshop" cases. They claim that in each 
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case, the injured Plaintiffs were minors who had purchased 
alcohol directly from the Defendants. 
That statement is not true. In -Rees, the action sought 
contribution for fifty four thousand, seven hundred forty two and 
50/100 dollars ($54,742.50), which had been paid on the part of 
Rees in satisfaction of claims against him. The summary judgment 
in favor of Albertson's was reversed and remanded by this Court. 
It will be noted that this appears to be an insurance subrogation 
and not a suit against Albertson's, Inc. for injuries to Rees. 
The plain implication of that case is that Dramshop liability 
existed in this state before the passage of the Dramshop Act and 
that there was third party causes of action. 
In Yost, the statement of facts shows that all of the 
alcohol was purchased by one Hammond (age 18), a friend of Yost. 
Here again, this Court has approved an action against a liquor 
provider to third persons who injured the claimant. A careful 
reading of that case will show that the action is by the person 
to whom the liquor was sold. This shows conclusively that there 
was common law Dramshop Liability in this state before the 
adoption of the first Dramshop Act in 1981. 
Defendants then claim that the Dramshop Act pre-empted all 
coitoaon law causes of action and bases the assertion on Retherford 
v. AT&T Communications 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). 
We again point out that Plaintiffs suit embraces several 
causes of action. One of which relates to the negligent sale of 
2 
alcohol to Paul Bredehoft, which is a common law claim and the 
violation of the Alcohol Beverage Control Act. The issue in 
Retherford was whether the employees' common law claims were pre-
empted by the Utah Anti Discrimination Act or by the Federal Taft 
Hardley Act. The statute of limitations had run on a number of 
the claims that could have been brought under those two acts. 
However, there were other claims not embraced within the two acts 
and Plaintiff was permitted to proceed to trial on those claims. 
Retherford dealt only with statutory pre-emption regarding 
common law claims. Plaintiff's causes of action assert claims 
under both the Dramshop Act, common law negligence and violation 
of the Alcohol Beverage Control Act. Both statutes were adopted 
at the same legislative session (in 1985). There is nothing in 
either act which states that it is an exclusive remedy, (cf Title 
34A-5-107(15), which specifically states that the procedures 
contained in that section are the exclusive remedy under state 
law for employment discrimination). The two liquor sections of 
the law stand on equal footing. How can it be said that one 
statute pre-empts the other, or that either pre-empt common law 
causes of action? 
The 1997 Legislature amended the Dramshop Act (32A-14-101). 
Each house of the Legislature adopted virtually identical "intent 
language" for the amendments. The Senate Journal contains the 
following: 
INTENT LANGUAGE FOR SUB. S.B. 112 
On Motion of Senator Buhler, the following intent 
language is printed in the Senate Journal. Senator Mayne 
commented. 
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The express inclusion of wrongful death to Section 32A-
14-101 does not create a new right but merely clarifies that 
a person has the right to recover both special and several 
(sic general) damages for wrongful death under the Dramshop 
Act. 
The bill does not modify any common law right that 
exists for injuries or wrongful death resulting from giving, 
selling, or otherwise providing alcoholic beverages. 
The House Journal states the intent language as follows: 
INTENT LANGUAGE ON Sub S.b. 112 
In passing 1st Substitute Senate Bill 112, Dramshop 
Liability Amendments, the Legislature intends the following: 
The express inclusion of wrongful death to Section 31A-
14-101 does not create a new right but merely clarifies that 
a person has the right to recover both special and general 
damages for wrongful death under the Dramshop Act. 
The bill does not modify any common law right that 
exists for injuries or wrongful death resulting from giving, 
selling, or otherwise providing alcoholic beverages. 
When the Defendants asked this Court to adopt their 
reasoning that the "Dramshop Act pre-empts all other common law 
and statutory claims of civil liability for furnishing alcohol to 
another", they may not have been aware that the Legislature of 
the State of Utah does not agree. 
This Court must reverse the lower Court Order dismissing 
Plaintiffs' statutory and common law claims. 
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POINT TWO: THE DRAMSHOP DAMAGE CAP IS NOT CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Under this point, Defendant argues only that Article XVI, § 
5 of the Utah Constitution has no application to this case. In 
support, it cites cases, such as Tiede v. State 915 P.2d 500 
(Utah 1996) and McCorvey v. Department of Transportation 868 P.2d 
41 (Utah 1993). Those cases deal only with the concept of 
"Governmental Immunity". The state can be sued only if it gives 
it's consent. If the state does consent, then it may impose 
conditions on that consent including a damage limitation. In the 
case of Condemarin v. University Hospital 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 
1989), cited but not discussed by Defendant, the Court determined 
that the University Hospital was acting in a proprietary capacity 
and therefore, the damage cap was constitutionally flawed under a 
due process and uniform operation of the laws analysis. 
Condemarin has controlling importance in this case. 
In Plaintiff's opening brief, numerous provisions of the 
Utah Constitution are cited, each of which or in combination, 
show that the damage cap is unconstitutional. 
Defendants dismiss all of Plaintiff's arguments in that 
regard by stating that Plaintiffs never raised these 
constitutional issues in the trial court and hence they cannot be 
asserted on appeal. The statement is astonishing to say the 
least. The attention of the Court is invited to a Memorandum 
filed by Plaintiffs on June 27, 1996, following the entry of the 
verdict in this case (R. 1288). The Court will see immediately 
that Plaintiffs cite Article XVI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution as 
well as Article I, § 24 (Uniform Operation of Laws) and Article 
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I, § 11 (Open Courts of the Utah Constitution). Even further, in 
a Memorandum filed on August 5, 1996, in response to the brief of 
Amicus (R. 1425), Plaintiffs stated at Pg. 1427: 
In a footnote to "Amicus" Point II it is stated that 
there are no constitutional issues in this case because a 
common law action against a liquor provider did not exist. 
The premise for the conclusion is erroneous and even 
further, there are several constitutional provisions that 
bear on this case regardless of whether a common law action 
against a liquor provider existed. So that there will be no 
doubt in anyone's mind, the damage cap in the Dramshop Act 
violates the following provisions of the Utah Constitution: 
1. Article I, § 7 (Due Process of Law) 
2. Article I, § 10 (Trial by Jury) 
3. Article I, § 11 (Open Courts) 
4. Article I, § 24 (Uniform Operation of Law) 
5. Article XVI, § 5 (Wrongful Death - Damages) 
Cases already before this Court, such as Condemarin v. 
University Hospital 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), point to the 
conclusion that when the rights of a class of citizens are 
taken away by the Legislature, such as the damage cap in 
this case, the Legislation cannot pass the heightened 
scrutiny test imposed by the Utah Constitution. Even before 
that point is reached, the damage cap must fail under 
Article XVI, § 5 where the Legislature is prohibited from 
abrogating the Wrongful Death Statute or limiting the amount 
of damage thereunder. 
Although the lower Court disagreed with Plaintiffs' position 
regarding the constitutional issues, it clearly knew that they 
had been briefed and argued. In it's Memorandum decision (R. 
1521), after discussing Article XVI, § 5 of the Utah 
Constitution, the Court states at Page 1524, the following: 
The Court does not find that the other constitutional 
provisions relied upon by the Plaintiffs could allow this 
Court to declare the damage cap unconstitutional. 
Accordingly, this Court is required to grant Defendant 
private clubs' motion to enter the Judgment against them in 
accordance with the damage limitation imposed by legislative 
mandate. 
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There can be no question that all of the constitutional 
issues raised by Plaintiff on this appeal, were cited and argued 
before the lower Court. 
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POINT THREE: PLAINTIFFS DO HAVE STANDING TO SUE THE DEFENDANT 
LIQUOR PROVIDERS FOR THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF THEIR SON, SEAN 
ADKINS. 
Defendants claim under this point that Plaintiffs lack 
standing to sue and as support for that proposition, they adopt 
points I, II, and III of the brief filed by Amicus. 
Defendants raise this issue for the first time on appeal. 
It is true that this issue first surfaced in the lower Court in a 
memorandum filed, not by Defendants, but by Amicus after the case 
had been tried. In its brief, in an argument before the Court, 
it suggested to the Court that the Utah Dramshop Act did not 
allow a suit for wrongful death, and therefore the case should be 
dismissed. 
The lower Court dealt summarily with that assertion and 
ruled that the Utah Dramshop Act did embrace a cause of action 
for wrongful death and that if the Legislature intended that 
result, it did not so state. The lower Court stated: 
While the courts must follow the clear mandates of 
legislative statutes, the language relating to the types of 
injuries and damages that may be sued upon under the 
Dramshop Act is less than a model of clarity. A fair 
reading of the statute does not suggest to this Court that 
the Legislature intended to allow recovery for injuries and 
damages as a result of a violation of the Dramshop Act for 
any injury or loss, as long as it does not result in death, 
the greatest loss. Where a legislative statute and its 
scope are not clear or is ambiguous, this Court should not 
impose an interpretation upon that legislative statute that 
causes an unreasonable result. There is no logical reason, 
either in this record or in the Court's mind that could 
justify a conclusion that the Legislature in creating a 
statutory right of action against a liquor provider as 
contained in the Dramshop Act, intended to exclude a cause 
of action to persons who had suffered a loss because of the 
death of a child, such as the plaintiffs here. If the 
Legislature was intent on carving out an exception to 
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persons who have a cause of action under the Dramshop Act so 
as to exclude death claims, it could have easily said so, 
and it did not. This Court declines to read such an 
illogical statement to the unclear language of the statute. 
(R. 1527-1528) 
Amicus requested and was granted leave to file a brief by 
this Court. The three points contained in the current brief and 
relied upon by Defendants are similar to those asserted below. 
They are: 
POINT ONE: THE WRONGFUL DEATH ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO THE 
UTAH DRAMSHOP ACT. 
POINT TWO: PLAINTIFFS MAY NOT RECOVER UNDER THE DRAMSHOP 
ACT FOR THE DEATH OF THEIR SON. 
POINT THREE: THE COURT IS NOT BOUND BY THE PARTIES 
STIPULATION THAT THE WRONGFUL DEATH ACT 
PROVIDES A BASIS FOR RECOVERY AGAINST THE 
DRAMSHOP DEFENDANTS. 
A. This Court will not consider issues raised for the first 
time on appeal. 
The Defendants would, of course, have accepted a dismissal 
of this case based upon the suggestion of Amicus. However, they 
made no issue of that point in the lower Court. It was not until 
this appeal that Defendants adopt the position of Amicus. 
This Court has announced in a number of cases that it will 
not entertain an issue raised for the first time, post judgment 
or on appeal. LeBaron & Associates v. NEC Information Systems 
823 P.2d 479 (Utah 1991) cited therein are Turtle Management, 
Inc. v. Hagas Management, Inc. 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982); and 
James v. Preston 746 P.2d 799 (Utah Ap. 1987). In the LeBaron 
case, it is stated: 
... It would make little sense to allow a party to 
proceed at trial without submitting a legal theory to the 
court, and then allow that party to raise the issue 
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following trial and require the court to re-open trial to 
consider the issue... (LeBaron & Associates Supra) 
B. The Defendants Stipulated that the Wrongful death statutes 
of the State of Utah fully applied in this action. 
On the 5th day of April, 1996, at a hearing of motions 
pending before the lower Court, Defendants stipulated that the 
wrongful death statute for the death of a child applied without 
exception, to Plaintiffs cause of action. This Stipulation was 
embodied in a Court Order dated April 22, 1996. A copy of the 
Court Order (R. 1025-26) is attached as Addendum "A", to this 
brief. The case was tried to the jury, based in part upon that 
Court Order. When a party stipulates to a matter of fact of law 
before trial, and then attempts to repudiate that stipulation 
following trial, this is entirely inappropriate and beyond the 
scope of any procedural rule. 
C. The wrongful death statutes apply to the Utah Dramshop Act. 
The Utah Legislature has stated its intent regarding causes 
under the Dramshop Act in the broadest terms. The liquor 
provider is liable for: 
Injuries in person, property, or means of support to 
any third person, or to the spouse, child, or parent of that 
third person, resulting from the intoxication. (Title 32A-
14-101(1)) 
Then to emphasize that intent, it added Section (3) to the 
Statute which reads: 
A person who suffers an injury under Subsection 1 has a 
cause of action against the person who provided the 
alcoholic beverage in violation of Subsection 1. 
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When the Legislature provided a cause of action to a spouse, 
child or parent of the third person, it obviously contemplated a 
wrongful death action. 
When the Legislature amended the Dramshop Liability Act in 
1997, it made the above interpretation clear in its intent 
language. 
The express inclusion of wrongful death to Section 
[32A-14-101] does not create a new right but merely 
clarifies that a person has the right to recover both 
special and general damages for wrongful death under the 
Dramshop Act. (Senate Journal, Friday, January 31, 1997 and 
House Journal, Wednesday, February 19, 1997) 
If further support were needed, the Court is invited to 
consider the case of Beaupre v. Boulevard Billiard Club 510 A.2d 
415 (Rhode Island 1986). In that case the lower Court held that 
the Dramshop Act of Rhode Island did not allow a wrongful death 
action. On appeal, the Court reversed, stating as follows: 
Section 3-11-1 represents the current trend in our 
society to deal with the serious problem of alcohol-related 
injury by holding those individuals who dispense 
intoxicating beverages in violation of liquor laws 
responsible for the consequences of their actions. It is 
the manifest intent of the Legislature that this statute be 
construed liberally to further the Legislature's declared 
purpose of promoting the reasonable control of the traffic 
in alcoholic beverages G.L. 1956 (1976 Reenactment) § 3-1-
5. To implement this legislative intent, the statute was 
couched in the broadest of terms, allowing recovery for "any 
injury" caused by the wrongful action of an intoxicated 
person. The pain and suffering associated with a fatal 
injury as well as the wrongful death of an individual are 
certainly within the context of the phrase "any injury to 
the person". The plain language of the statute, when 
coupled with the clear legislative intent, compels a finding 
that the wrongful death of an individual constitutes a 
compensable injury under § 3-11-1. 
11 
POINT FOUR: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING THAT 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES COULD BE AWARDED IN THIS CASE. 
Under this point, Defendants state that the Dramshop Act 
does not provide for punitive damages, therefore, punitive 
damages cannot be awarded. 
Whether punitive damages can be awarded against Dramshop 
Defendants is a matter of first impression. This issue is 
inferentially addressed in the case of Biswell v. Duncan 742 P.2d 
39 (Utah 1987). The appeals court held: 
After careful examination of the authorities on this 
question, we hold that punitive damages are recoverable 
against a drunken driver in an automobile personal injury 
case where it can be established (1) that the Defendant 
motorist acted with actual malice or a reckless disregard of 
the rights and safety of others, and (2) that his drunken 
driving was a contributing cause of the accident. We 
believe that one who drives a car after voluntarily drinking 
to excess, with its great potential for causing serious 
injury, could be found, under proper circumstances, to 
demonstrate a "reckless indifference to the rights of 
others" sufficient to allow the issue of punitive damages to 
be considered by the trier of fact... 
***************** 
... Cognizant of the grave problems drunk driving poses, the 
Utah Legislature has enacted one of the strongest impaired 
driving laws in the country. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-44 
-41-6-44.20 (1987). In addition, the 1981 Legislature 
passed the "Dramshop Act" which imposes liability for those 
who provide intoxicating liquors which result in injuries to 
third persons. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-1 (1986). These 
statutes represent a legislative determination that public 
safety is gravely endangered when a person operates a motor 
vehicle after consuming alcoholic beverages... 
Following Biswell, the Legislature adopted 17-18-1 UCA 1953 
relating to punitive damages. The statute in part reads: 
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive 
damages may be awarded only if compensatory or general 
damages are awarded and it is established by clear and 
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the 
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tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or 
intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests 
a knowing and reckless indifference toward and a disregard 
of, the rights of others. 
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and 
standards of conduct of Subsection (1)(a) do not apply to 
any claim for punitive damages arising out of the 
torfeasor's operation of a motor vehicle while voluntarily 
intoxicated or under the influence of any drug or 
combination of alcohol and drugs as prohibited by Section 
41-66-44... 
The standards and limitations in the act do not apply to 
intoxicated drivers and that by necessary implication, should not 
apply to those who furnish the alcohol.1 As stated in Biswell, 
punitive damages may be awarded against intoxicated drivers. It 
must logically follow that punitive damages may be awarded 
against those who supply the alcohol. There is no provision of 
the Dramshop Act which states or implies that punitive damages 
may not be awarded. This case gives the Court an opportunity to 
extend the reasoning of Biswell and to clearly state that 
punitive damages may be awarded against alcohol providers under 
the same standards as applied to intoxicated drivers. 
Here the two clubs gave the driver Bredehoft enough alcohol 
to bring his BAC to 0.27 at the time of the accident. This is 
three and one half times the statutory limit. Clearly that type 
of conduct must be punished and punitive damages appears to be 
the only way to impose responsibility. 
The Lower Court, in it's instructions submitted the issue to the jury on a clear and convincing standard. 
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POINT FIVE: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TO THE INDIVIDUAL MICKELSON DEFENDANTS AND CLUB MANAGEMENT, INC. 
Before trial, the lower Court granted summary judgment to 
the individual Mickelson Defendants and Club Management, Inc. 
In support of the summary judgment granted by the lower 
Court, Defendants base their claim of immunity upon the fact that 
they complied with the law in that the two private clubs, Uncle 
Bart's Club and Charley's Club were properly formed non-profit 
corporations and that Club Management, Inc. the profit 
corporation was properly formed and existing at the time of the 
events giving rise to the action and did not sell liquor to Paul 
G. Bredehoft. 
The Mickelson Family had such a community of interest in 
ownership with the three corporations that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individuals no longer 
existed; and that to sanction a corporate shield in this case 
would promote an injustice. Furthermore, the various elements 
relating to this subject disclosed by the facts developed prior 
to trial, show that there is a genuine issue of material fact 
that should have been determined by a jury. 
The facts taken from the financial documents and depositions 
of the individuals show the following: 
1. Uncle Bart's Club and Charley's Club were acquired by 
Mickelsons for approximately $31,000.00 in about 1989 or 1990. 
The personal property represented by that purchase became the 
property of Club Management, Inc. This property is leased to 
Uncle Bart's Club and Charley's Club under the terms of a 
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Management Agreement between Club Management, Inc. and two other 
clubs. Neither of the private clubs have any assets. 
2. All of the officers, trustees, and directors of the 
Club Management, Inc., and the two clubs are all members of the 
Mickelson Family. There are no outsiders. 
3. It is not possible from reference to the stock 
certificates attached to Defendant's Memorandum to determine who 
the stock holders are in Club Management, Inc., except James D. 
Mickelson and Jeannie B. Mickelson. There is some indication 
that Douglas J. Mickelson and Marlene M. Mickelson were 
stockholders but there is no certificate to so indicate. Jeannie 
B. Mickelson, in her deposition, did not know whether she was a 
stockholder of Club Management, Inc. (Deposition of Jeannie B. 
Mickelson, Page 13) 
4. Uncle Bart's Club and Charley's Club are in form, non 
profit corporations owned by its members. However, each of the 
those clubs have entered into an identical management contract 
with Club Management, Inc. (Ex 21) Under the terms of the 
contract, the clubs purchase the liquor and other consumables. 
All of the personnel utilized by the clubs are provided by Club 
Management, Inc. Additionally, Club Management, Inc. provides 
management services. 
5. Under the Management Contract, Club Management, Inc., 
is entitled to receive for its services, $35.00 per hour not to 
exceed One Hundred Five (105) hours per week. Potentially, Club 
Management, Inc., could earn from each club, the sum of one 
hundred ninety one thousand, one hundred dollars ($191,100.00) 
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per year. Neither of the clubs show a profit of any consequence. 
The money is siphoned off each club for the benefit of the 
Mickelson Family. 
6. None of the "members11 of Uncle Bart's Club or Charley's 
Club participate either in the management of the club or its 
gross profit. There is no evidence that any profits or other 
benefits are ever returned to the members. 
7. There is no evidence that either of the clubs held 
Trustees meetings. 
8. There is no evidence that Club Management, Inc., held 
regular directors meetings. 
9. At most, once per year, the family met and signed 
corporate papers prepared by James Mickelson, who is an attorney. 
(Deposition of Marlene M. Mickelson, Page 18) 
10. All money generated by the club is handled and 
controlled exclusively by the Mickelson Family. 
A. Compliance with some corporate formalities is not sufficient 
to provide insulation for personal liability. 
The rule adopted by the Utah Court regarding the Alter Ego 
Doctrine was distinctly stated in the case of Colman v. Colman 
743 P.2d 782 (Utah). 
To disregard the corporate entity under the equitable 
alter ego doctrine, two circumstances must be shown: (1) 
Such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual no 
longer exist, but the corporation is, instead, the alter ego 
of one or a few individuals; and (2) if observed, the 
corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or 
result in an inequity, (citing cases) It is not necessary 
that the plaintiff prove actual fraud, but must only show 
that failure to pierce the corporate veil would result in an 
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injustice. Healthwin-Midtown Convalescent Hosp., 511 F. 
Supp. at 420. 
Certain factors which are deemed significant, although not 
conclusive, in determining whether this test has been met 
include: (1) undercapitalization of a one-man corporation; 
(2) failure to observe corporate formalities (3) nonpayment 
of dividends; (4) siphoning of corporate funds by the 
dominant stockholder; (5) non functioning of other officers 
or directors; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) the use 
of the corporation as a facade for operations of the 
dominant stockholder or stockholders; and (8) the use of the 
corporate entity in promoting injustice or fraud. (citing 
cases) 
Although corporate documents were prepared and filed with 
the State of Utah and the UTAH ALCOHOL BEVERAGE COMMISSION, they 
were mere formalities. Charley's Club and Uncle Bart's Club are 
non profit corporations. Club Management, Inc., is a for profit 
corporation. Club Management has a management agreement with 
Uncle Bart's Club and Charley's Club. The Agreements are 
identical. The basic structure of the agreement is that Club 
Management, Inc., will lease to the non-profit corporations, 
employees and equipment and provide management. (Ex 21) 
A significant provision of the agreement is that Club 
Management, Inc., will provide not less than three senior 
officers as managers. In fact, only one member of the Mickelson 
Family was involved in the management duties at Uncle Bart's Club 
and one member at Charley's Club; Jeannie B. Mickelson at 
Charley's Club and Marlene M. Mickelson at Uncle Bart's Club. 
The evidence shows that for the most part, their duties consisted 
of employing personnel, purchasing liquor and supplies, and 
monitoring liquor inventory as matched to cash register tapes to 
control any leakage of either liquor or money from the club. 
There was no management at either club on March 1, 1994, at the 
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time that Paul G. Bredehoft was drinking at Uncle Bart's Club and 
Charley's Club. In fact, Jeannie B. Mickelson testified that she 
was the manager of Charley's Club and she usually left the club 
by 2:30 in the afternoon (Deposition of Jeannie B. Mickelson, 
Page 49). There was no oversight or instruction given to 
bartenders. Marlene M. Mickelson was manager of Uncle Bart's 
Club and performed the same work for Uncle Bart's that Jeannie B. 
Mickelson did for Charley's Club. She usually left the club 
between 6:30 and 7:30 p.m. leaving the club in charge of the 
bartender (Deposition of Marlene M. Mickelson, Page 43). When 
she hired bartenders she did not tell them how much liquor they 
could give any one person in a given period of time (Deposition 
of Marlene M. Mickelson, Page 41). 
There apparently was very little management related to 
compliance with the law and regulations of the UABC. As an 
example, the membership lists of both club (Ex 30 and 31) show 
that Paul G. Bredehoft was not a member of either club in 1994, 
the year of the accident. The law is clear on this subject. § 
32A-5-107(7) provides: 
A private club may not sell alcoholic beverages to any 
person other than a member, guest, or visitor who holds a 
valid visitor card issued under Subsection (6). 
The case of DeFusion Co. v. Utah Liquor Control Com'n 613 
P.2d 1120 (Utah 1980) held: 
A person who is not a member or who does not hold a valid 
guest card is an "interdicted person" with respect to 
alcoholic drinks in the club. Thus, the sale of liquor to 
such a person, as well as the purchase from the liquor store 
by such person, is proscribed by the statutes. 
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All of the Mickelson Family know Paul G. Bredehoft. Douglas 
Mickelson knew that he had had at least one prior DUI. James 
Mickelson represented Paul G. Bredehoft in a DUI in Tooele County 
and knew that he had had prior DUI's (Deposition of James 
Mickelson, Pg. 71). James Mickelson was on the premises of Uncle 
Bart's briefly the night of the accident. He spoke to Paul G. 
Bredehoft and saw that he had a drink in front of him (Deposition 
of James Mickelson, Pg. 75). The Mickelson Family committed a 
crime by allowing Paul Bredehoft to drink liquor at the two 
clubs. 
Another important factor is the way the money generated by 
the clubs was handled. No one, other than the Mickelson Family, 
had access to the money. 
There is testimony in the depositions that the only money 
received by the Mickelson Family was a management fee of 
approximately $1500.00 per month to Marlene M. Mickelson and 
Jeannie B. Mickelson. There were some legal fees paid to James 
D. Mickelson. However, examination of the tax returns for 1993, 
attached to Defendants Memorandum, points in a different 
direction. The gross income of both clubs for 1993 is 
$770,651.00. Of that amount, $184,545.99 was charged to employee 
expense. Then there is a combined charge for both clubs for 
advertising and promotion of $113,565.85. We know that only the 
Mickelson Family had access to the checks and cash of the two 
clubs. If the advertising and promotion accounts for 1993 were 
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spent for that purpose then it is a violation of statute. Title 
32A-5-107(23) UCA provides: 
A private club may not engage in any public 
solicitation or public advertising calculated to increase 
its membership. 
If the account was a true advertising and promotion account, 
it violated statute. If it were used for other purposes, there 
was a diversion of funds from what would otherwise be the capital 
of both clubs. 
It is obvious that the Mickelson Family makes its living 
from these two private clubs. Title 32A-5-107(22) provides: 
A private club may not pay any person or entity any 
fee, salary, rent, or other payment of any kind in excess of 
the fair market value for the service rendered, goods 
furnished, or facilities or equipment rented. It is the 
intention of this subsection to insure that no officer, 
managing agent, employee, or other person derives economic 
benefit from the operation of the club. 
The Mickelson Family clearly benefits economically from the 
two private clubs in violation of the statute. There is abundant 
evidence at this point that the two private clubs and Club 
Management, Inc., share a complete unity of interest with the 
Mickelson Family. They comprise all of the officers, directors, 
and trustees of the entities. They handle all of the money. The 
clubs and management company operate for the sole benefit of the 
Mickelson Family. No dividends are paid, no club members other 
than the family participate in management and no benefits are 
ever returned to the members. The purposes of the two clubs are 
not educational, charitable, or recreational as they claim to be 
(See Articles of Incorporation of Charley's Club, Inc. a Non 
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Profit Corporation as R. 1844, Ex 35). The sole reason for the 
existence of the clubs is to sell alcoholic beverages for the 
profit of the Mickelson Family. It is also clear that they do 
not adequately manage the clubs or provide the senior officers 
for management. 
B. To Allow Corporate Immunity in this Case Would be To 
Sanction a Fraud. Promote Injustice, or Result in an Inequity. 
This point relates to the second circumstance set forth in 
the Colman case (Supra.) and followed in the case of Envirotech 
Corp. v. Callahan 872 P.2d 487 (Utah 1994). 
As noted earlier, Paul G. Bredehoft would have had to have a 
total of 18 to 22 drinks. Paul G. Bredehoft consumed the alcohol 
producing his intoxication at the two clubs operated by the 
Mickelson Family and managed by Club Management, Inc. 
Patti Middaugh, one of the bartenders at Uncle Bart's Club, 
testified in her deposition that when Paul G. Bredehoft left the 
premises on March 1, 1994, at approximately 6:30 he had consumed 
seven drinks (Deposition of Patti Middaugh, Page 30). This was 
sufficient to put his BAC over the statutory presumption of 0.08. 
In addition, that number of drinks violated the standard 
promulgated by "T.I.P.S." which all bartenders must adhere. This 
is usually one drink per hour. Jackie Lackey, the bartender who 
preceded Patti Middaugh, testified that she served Paul Bredehoft 
seven (7) drinks (Tr. 443). 
Paul G. Bredehoft was an interdicted person by definition 
and hence it was a crime for either club to serve him liquor. 
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It is important to note also, that Title 32A-12-103 provides 
that parties in charge are vicariously criminally liable as 
principals with those who are guilty of the offense. 
When the entire State Alcohol Beverage Control Act is 
surveyed, if it is apparent that it is, as stated, an exercise of 
the police power for the protection of the citizens of this State 
and fastens regulatory control and criminal liability on all 
those who participate in the sale of alcoholic beverages in 
violation of law. Reeves v. Gentile 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991) 
The individual Defendants and Club Management, Inc. assert 
that they did not sell Paul Bredehoft liquor and therefore cannot 
be guilty of a violation of the DABC. Plaintiffs stress to the 
Court that providing Paul Bredehoft with a sufficient amount of 
liquor to create a 0.27 BAC was criminal. Plaintiffs stress to 
the Court that the principals in these two clubs are vicariously 
liable for the criminal violation pursuant to Title 32A-12-103 
UCA 1953. The violation of Title 32A-5-107(24)(h) is a crime. 
The individual Defendants and Club Management, Inc. are liable 
for that crime. As here, the violation gives rise to a civil 
cause of action. The lower Court erred in granting summary 
judgment to the individual Defendants and Club Management, Inc. 
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POINT SIX: PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE SEPARATE AND APART FROM 
DAMAGES CONTEMPLATED BY THE DAMAGE CAP IN THE DRAMSHOP ACT. 
Under this point, Defendants state that the terms of the 
damage cap section of the Dramshop Act, limit the amount to one 
hundred thousand dollars ($100,000,00) regardless of whether it 
is determined to be general or punitive damages. 
Except for Article XVI, § 5 (Wrongful Death), Defendants 
have not argued the constitutionality of the damage cap. If this 
Court determines, as surely it must, that the Damage Cap is 
unconstitutional, then the argument of Defendants under this 
point is moot. If however, the Court should determine that the 
Dramshop Cap is constitutional, then the Court must further 
determine whether the Damage Cap embraces both compensatory and 
punitive damages. Defendants do not cite any authority or case 
law for their conclusion. The answer to the question is 
contained in the statute, but not the conclusion Defendants are 
striving for. 
In Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101(5), it is stated: 
The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any 
person pursuant to a cause of action under this chapter ... 
(emphasis added) 
Subsection (3) of the statute reads: 
A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has a 
cause of action against the person who provided the 
alcoholic beverage in violation of Subsection (1) 
The statute obviously refers to a cause of action for 
injury. This in turn means general and special compensatory 
damage, but not punitive damages. 
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It is well to remember that punitive damages, although based 
upon an underlying cause of action for injury, serve a far 
different function than compensatory damage. Punitive damages 
are awarded as punishment and deterrence, where conduct, as in 
this case, is outrageous. Johnson v. Rogers 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 
1988) . 
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POINT SEVEN: THE LOWER COURT DAMAGE AWARD TO EACH PARENT IN THE 
AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($100,000.00) AGAINST EACH 
DEFENDANT IS CORRECT. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the decision of the Court holding 
that the Dramshop Damage Cap is not unconstitutional2, then the 
interpretation of the Court as to the award of General Damages, 
namely one hundred thousand ($100,000.00) to each Plaintiff 
against each Dramshop Defendant, is correct. Reference to the 
statute will make the Courts reasoning clear: 
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise 
provides liquor, or at a location allowing consumption on 
the premises, any alcoholic beverage, to the following 
person, and by those actions causes the intoxication of 
that person, is liable for injuries in person, property, or 
means of support to any third person, or to the spouse, 
child, or parent of that third person, resulting from the 
intoxication. . . (emphasis added) 
It will be noted that the statute uses the term "parent" in 
its singular individual form, and not in the joint form 
"parents". The Legislature intended, by that language, to make 
the Dramshop operator liable to the parents of a deceased child 
separately and not jointly as a unit. Both parents have a 
separate cause of action for their injuries and damage. 
The Statute continues: 
(3) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has 
a cause of action against the person who provided the 
alcoholic beverage in violation of Subsection(1). (emphasis 
added) 
Plaintiffs position throughout this case is that the Damage Cap is unconstitutional and defends the decision of the 
Court in the alternative. 
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The Act does not provide a cause of action for a group, such 
as "children" and "parents". It provides a cause of action for 
each "person" who suffers an injury. 
The Statute goes on to state: 
(5) The total amount of damages that my be awarded to 
any person pursuant to a cause of action under this chapter 
that arises after July 1, 1985, is limited to $100,000.00 
and the aggregate amount which may be awarded to all persons 
injured as a result of one occurrence is limited to 
$300,000.00. (emphasis added) 
Here again, the Statute speaks of damages awarded to a 
person and not a group. 
Case Law supports the reasoning of the Court. In the Utah 
case of Switzer v. Reynolds 606 P.2d 44 (Utah 1980), the 
decedent, Switzer, was killed in an accident on June 24, 1963. 
He left surviving, a wife and five (5) minor children. Not until 
1974, did the surviving wife, as guardian for the children, file 
an action on their behalf for the death of their father. The 
lower Court dismissed the case on the evident ground that the 
statute of limitations had run. The Supreme Court held that the 
statute was tolled during the minority of the children, ruling 
that even though the limitations statute might bar recovery for 
one heir, it could be tolled for other heirs. The Court stated: 
The wrongful death action of § 78-11-7 is not a joint 
cause of action. Therefore, a defense which would bar 
recovery by one of the heirs will not preclude all other 
heirs. Thus, individual circumstances may toll the statute 
of limitations of § 78-12-28(2) as to one of the heirs. The 
concept that the wrongful death action is a joint cause of 
action has been rejected in recent decisions, which will be 
discussed infra. 
The reasoning applied in Switzer, in the case of death to an 
adult leaving heirs, applies equally to the wrongful death action 
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of a child set forth in § 78-11-6 UCA 1953. See also In Re 
Behm's Estate, 213 P.2d 657 (Utah 1950). 
Cases from another jurisdiction relate specifically to the 
Dramshop Act of that state and the damage cap in the statute. In 
the case of Childers v. Modglin, 119 N.E.2d 519 (111. 1954) 
action was brought under the Dramshop Act by the surviving wife 
and ten (10) children of Childers. The theory of the Complaint 
was that the Plaintiffs were entitled to the damage cap of 
$15,000 for each of the eleven Plaintiffs. Defendant argued that 
the maximum that could be recovered was the damage cap of $15,000 
in the aggregate. The Court held: 
By applying the limit in this case to each cause of 
action separately, all parts of the statute are consistent, 
the application is definite and certain, it applies equally 
to all persons, and makes the statute practical and 
workable. To apply the limit to a group of persons 
produces inconsistency within the statute itself, leads to 
consequences at times absurd, results in a variety of 
inequalities, and is wholly impractical in its operation 
without extensive tinkering; in fact, it would require the 
courts to fill in a number of voids which would normally be 
regulated by statute, if any such system had been 
contemplated. 
Under these conditions we reject the objectionable 
alternative, and hold that the limit of recovery applies to 
each separate right of action as it previously existed. Any 
plaintiff who is injured within the terms of the statute has 
the right to recover up to, but not exceeding, $15,000.00, 
regardless of the existence of other claims, established or 
establishable, and regardless of the number of defendants 
sued or suable. 
The decision of the Childers' case was followed in the 
later Illinois case of Hudson v. Leverenz, 132 N.E.2d 427 (111.)3 
Following the two cases cited, the Illinois Legislature amended the Dramshop Act and it was held in Moran v. 
Katsinas, 157 N.E.2d 38 (111. 1959) that the cap applied regardless of the number of injured parties. The Court did 
not however, overrule the two cases cited above. 
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To underscore the reasoning of the lower Court, we suggest 
two hypotheticals. Assume a situation where a child is killed 
under circumstances giving rise to a Dramshop Action. Assume 
further that the parents are divorced. The Court could not 
compel them to make common cause against the Dramshop Act. They 
would each have a cause of action and the damages awarded would 
be commensurate with the individual loss. Also, assume a further 
situation where the Dramshop Defendant has a defense to one of 
the parents. Obviously this would not bar a suit brought by the 
other parent. 
The Utah Dramshop Act is couched in terms of individual 
causes of action for those injured by a liquor provider. It 
contains no term or language indicating that those who suffer 
injury, such as parents or children, must join and aggregate 
their individual claims below the Dramshop Cap. 
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POINT EIGHT: THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANTS 
MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT AND NEW TRIAL 
WITH RESPECT TO PUNITIVE DAMAGE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS. 
Under this point, Defendant, Charley's Club must marshal the 
evidence in support of the jury's award of punitive damages. The 
statement is incomplete and does not correctly portray the 
negative evidence. 
The Court is referred to the Statement of Facts contained in 
Plaintiffs' initial brief where these matters are highlighted. 
To emphasize this point, we note that Defendants have failed to 
discuss the fact that there was no senior management present at 
either club on the fatal night. Jim Mickelson was on the 
premises of Uncle Bart's, not Charley's Club as indicated on Page 
45 of Charley's Club brief. He spoke to Paul Bredehoft and 
noticed that he was drinking. Bredehoft was not a member of 
either club and it was a violation of the regulations and 
criminal statutes to serve him liquor. Yet, he consumed from 18 
to 22 ounces of liquor at Uncle Bart's and Charley's Club. Patti 
Middaugh, a bartender at Uncle Bart's said that when Paul 
Bredehoft left that club, he had consumed a sufficient number of 
drinks to make him legally intoxicated. (Tr. 153) 
Gloria Anderson, bartender at Charley's Club, would only 
admit that she served Paul Bredehoft one drink. If the 
bartenders are to be believed (obviously the jury did not believe 
them) then Paul Bredehoft only had seven or eight drinks that 
night and all the alcohol was imbibed at the two clubs (except 
the one half beer at the Clubhouse, which is not here involved). 
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(There is no indication that Bredehoft drank at establishments 
other than Uncle Bart's and Charley's as it implied on Page 45 of 
Charley's Club brief). Paul G. Bredehoft drank at only two 
establishments and those were Charley's Club and Uncle Bart's 
Club, owned and operated by the Mickelson Family. 
Steven Moreland was a former bartender employed at both 
clubs in 1993. He knew Paul G. Bredehoft and testified that 
Bredehoft was a frequent patron at Uncle Bart's and was always 
intoxicated when he left the bar. (Tr. 228) 
Steve Moreland attended employee meetings during the term of 
his employment. The underlying theme at these meetings was how 
to sell more drinks. Mr. Moreland was encouraged to sell more 
alcohol to patrons. (Tr. 225) 
Steve Moreland was never given any instructions as to how 
much liquor he could sell to a patron or when to stop serving a 
patron. (Tr. 224) He observed Bredehoft and Douglas Mickelson 
drinking together at Uncle Bart's. (Tr. 223) 
Defendants fail to recognize or state that there was no 
management at either club on the evening and night of the fatal 
accident; with one exception: James Mickelson stopped by Uncle 
Bart's for a few minutes, observed Paul Bredehoft and engaged him 
in conversation. Paul Bredehoft was not a member and should not 
have been served liquor. 
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POINT NINE: DEFENDANTS DID NOT SEEK A NEW TRIAL ON "ALL 
ISSUES" IN THE LOWER COURT. 
For the first time in this case, the Defendants ask this 
Court for a new trial on all issues under the guise of a Motion 
for New Trial on the issue of Punitive Damage. The matters under 
this point now briefed and argued before this Court by Defendants 
were not presented to the Court below on Motion for New Trial. 
(R. 1693-1708) 
Now Defendants ask for a new trial based upon the failure of 
the Court to apportion damages among Defendants, error in 
instructions, and error in awarding a joint and several judgment 
against Defendants. 
Defendants argue that this Court should re-examine and over 
rule, the case of Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991) and 
hold that the negligence of all Defendants must be compared. 
Defendants overlook the fact that the Dramshop Act contains the 
following: 
(7) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action 
or additional recovery against the person causing the 
injury. 
The Legislature has, by that section, clearly separated the 
person causing the injury from the liquor supplier and thereby 
makes apportionment impossible. 
Although not stated in Defendants brief, what they seek is 
to compare their culpability with that of Paul Bredehoft, thereby 
reducing their exposure to *the million dollar verdict. 
The actions of Paul Bredehoft on the fatal night were 
criminal. He was convicted of automobile homicide and that 
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conviction was recently affirmed on appeal by the Court of 
Appeals. State v. Bredehoft, 353 Utah Adv. Rep 3 (CA, 10/01/98) 
In a case such as this, where the liquor providers are under 
a positive statutory duty to prevent the very conduct on the part 
of Bredehoft that caused the death of Sean Adkins, how can the 
Defendants come before this Court and say they should be given 
the advantage of the conduct of Bredehoft? We do not believe 
that the Legislature intended such a result in the adoption of 
the comparative negligence statutes. See State v. McBride, 940 
P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Field v. Boyer Co. Utah Adv. Rep. 
10 (Utah 1998) and Cortez v. University Mall Shopping Center 941 
F.Supp 1096 (D. Utah 1996). Furthermore, neither Defendant filed 
a cross claim against the other or against Paul Bredehoft. In 
the case of National Services v. B. W. Norton Manufacturing, 937 
P.2d 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the Appeals Court stated: 
In reaching our conclusion, we recognize that prohibiting 
subsequent apportionment suits essentially requires joint 
torfeasor codefendants to raise cross-claims against each 
other in the underlying tort action or else such claims may 
be lost. As such, cross-claims for apportionment among 
joint torfeasor codefendants are mandatory. 
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POINT TEN: DEFENDANTS DID NOT REQUEST A NEW TRIAL OF THE 
LOWER COURT BASED UPON INSTRUCTION NO. 33. 
Defendants' Motion for New Trial in the lower Court was 
based on the issue of punitive damages. They now seek a new 
trial in this Court on all issues based upon the claim that 
wrongful death damages are not included in the Dramshop Act. 
This is not the approach they took in the lower Court. In the 
lower Court, they sought a new trial only on the issue of 
punitive damages (R. 1754) 
They overlook (1) the fact that they stipulated in open 
court that the Wrongful Death Act did apply to the Dramshop Act; 
(2) that the Legislature in it's "Intent Language" states that 
the Wrongful Death Acts applies; and (3) that in fact, the only 
rational interpretation of the Dramshop Act is that it does 
include actions and damages for wrongful death. 
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POINT ELEVEN: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD INTEREST 
FROM THE DAY OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT. 
This point has been adequately briefed by Plaintiffs in 
their brief. 
POINT TWELVE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A STAY OF 
EXECUTION IN THIS MATTER. 
This point has been adequately briefed by Plaintiffs in 
their brief. 
CONCLUSION 
1. Defendants assert that the Wrongful Death Statutes of 
the State of Utah do not apply to the Utah Dramshop Act. The 
argument is vilacious because: 
a. Defendants stipulated before trial that the Wrongful 
Death Act did apply and the lower Court so ordered. 
b. The Utah State Legislature in it's recent amendment to 
the Dramshop Act in its "Intent Language" said the Wrongful 
Death Statutes apply. 
c. Analysis of the language of the Dramshop Act shows that 
the Wrongful Death Acts apply. 
2. Defendants ignore one of the major issues in this case; 
the constitutionality of the Damage Cap in the Dramshop Act. 
(Except Article XVI, §5 (Wrongful Death)). The constitutional 
provisions briefed and argued in the lower Court by Plaintiffs 
mainly Article I, §7 (Due Process of Law); Article I, §10 (Trial 
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by Jury); Article I, §11 (Open Courts); Article I, §24 (Uniform 
Operation of Law). In addition to Article XVI, §5 (Wrongful 
Death - Damages), all point on erringly. Point Two, the 
conclusion that the Damage cap is unconstitutional. 
3. The Court erred in granting Summary Judgment to the 
individual Defendants and Club Management, Inc. 
4. The lower Court was in the advantaged position of 
hearing all the evidence and observing the demeanor and 
credibility of all the witnesses. It determined that punitive 
damages were properly submitted to the jury and the amount of 
damage awarded by the jury is well within the guidelines set 
forth in Crookston v. Farmers Insurance Exchange 817 P.2d 789 
(Utah 1991) 
The cross-appeal of Defendants should be denied and the 
relief requested by Plaintiffs in their appeal should be granted, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / day of October, 1998. 
GARRETT & GARRETT \ 
Edward M. /Garrett 
Attorney for 
P l a i n t i f f s / A p p e l l a n t s 
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UNCLE BART'S INC., dba UNCLE BART'S ; 
CLUB, CHARLEY'S CLUB, INC., dba ; 
CHARLEY'S CLUB, ANN SISTTIE, dba, THE ; 
CLUBHOUSE, CLUB MANAGEMENT, Inc., ; 
) ORDER 
) Civil No. 940907146 PI 
) Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Defendants. 
On the 5th day of April, 1996, at a hearing on various motions pending in this case, the 
Defendants and each of them in open court and on the record stipulated that the elements of 
damage for a cause of action, for the wrongful death of a child, as established by the Wrongful 
Death Statute 78-11 (78-11-6) and the interpreted case law of the Appellate Courts of the State 
of Utah apply without exception to this cause of action claiming a violation of the DramShop 
Liability Act 32A-14-101 U.C.A. (1953). 
FILE! Bi£7&£7 COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 2 2 1S86 
» y . 
IrOJS 
The Court having considered the stipulation of the Defendants now orders: 
1. That the Stipulation of Defendants as set forth above is the "law of the case" in 
this action and that the elements of a cause of action for the death of a child, as set forth in 
Title 78-11-6 U.C.A. (1953) and the interpretive decisions of the Appellate Cburts of this 
State apply without exeption to the cause of action pending in this CoxjFfoased upon Title 32A-
14-101 U.C.A. 1953 (DramShop Liability Act). 
Dated this fr^day of April, 1996. ' 
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